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Introduction
At the end of the Second Gulf War in early 1991, the Kurdish people in Iraq rose against 
Saddam Hussein’s regime by liberating most of the areas inhabited by them. However, 
within a few weeks, the uprising was crushed. The Iraqi army’s attack on Kurdish cities and 
villages and its retaliation against the Kurdish forces and civilians led to a mass exodus of 
the Kurds to Iran and Turkey. The international community’s intervention resulted in the 
creation of the northern no-fly-zone by the UN Security Council. This facilitated the return 
of most of Kurdish refugees back to their habitat. But the continued pressure by the Kurds 
on the regime forced the government to withdraw its forces, as well as the administrative 
units from parts of Kurdistan in October 1991. The Kurds then filled the vacuum created 
by holding elections in 1992, and thus began self-governance in the region.The areas under 
the control of Kurdish authorities since then came to be known as the Kurdistan Region 
(RG) which was a self-declared federal region in Iraq until 2005 when the Iraqi constitution 
officially recognized the region of Kurdistan, along with its existing authorities, as a federal 
region in Iraq.
The KR is located in north and north eastern parts of Iraq, Syria is to the west, Iran to 
the east, and Turkey to the north. Its area is 40,643 square kilometers with population of 
5,351,276 (estimated). The city of Erbil is the capital of the Region. Kurdish and Arabic are 
the official languages in the Region. However, Turkmeni, Assyrian and Armenian are also 
used by the respective communities in some areas. In addition to Kurds a diverse collection 
of ethnic and religious groups live side-by-side in the Region — including Arabs, Turkmen, 
Chaldeans, Syriacs, Assyrians, Yazidis, Kakayi and Shabaks. The region is geographically 
diverse, from hot plains to cooler mountainous areas where snow falls in the winter.
Historical Background
Before examining the history of the Kurdish Region (KR) in Iraq it will be useful, though 
briefly, to explore the history of Kurds and Kurdistan in general as the Kurdish question in 
Iraq can hardly be separated from the Kurdish question in the region and beyond. At the 
very outset it has to be mentioned that Kurdistan is not the name of a state, but rather, a land 
which in the twentieth century was divided among four states (Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria) 
by the colonial masters. Hence the Kurds are today the largest stateless territorial nation in 
the world. In the absence of proper census it is estimated that the Kurds population is around 
40 million with over 22 million in Turkey, over 8 million in Iran, over 6 million in Iraq 
and nearly 2 million in Syria. The Kurdish language is part of Indo-European languages.
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Most scholars tend to believe that there is a connection between the Medes, the founders of 
Median Empire who defeated Assyrians in 612BC, and the Kurds (Minorsky, 1992, p. 141; 
Nebez, 2004, p. 15). The land on which the Kurds now reside was invaded by Arab Muslims 
in the mid-seventh century. Consequently most Kurds converted to Islam. From the tenth 
century, as a result of weakening of the power of theIslamic caliphs’ the Kurds began to 
establish their own independent dynasties which lasted until the Mongolian invasions of the 
thirteenth century.
At the beginning of the sixteenth century the Kurdish areas became the main stake of 
rivalries between the Ottoman and Safavid empires. In 1514, the Kurdish-populated area was 
officially divided between the Ottomans and the Safavids. Initially the Kurds enjoyed some 
degree of autonomy and were able to establish several principalities which ruled different 
regions of Kurdistan (McDowall, 2004, p. 21-62). In 1834, the centralization policies of the 
Ottomans ended Kurdish self-rule and that led to several rebellions with no avail. 
After the defeat of Ottomans in World War I, the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres, which was 
signed between the Allies and the Ottomans recommended the creation of a Kurdish 
state. However, in 1923, a new treaty, the Treaty of Lausanne, signed between the newly 
established Turkish state and the Allied powerssuperseded the Treaty of Sèvres and did not 
take into consideration the Kurds and their national rights (Kirmanj, 2013, p.25), instead 
the Ottoman part of Kurdistan was divided into three newly created nation-states, Turkey, 
Iraq and Syria. The Safavid part of Kurdistan however,remained part of Iran. Furthermore, 
by all standards, these new states did not make any attempt to solve the Kurdish right to 
statehood.This resulted in ignoring Kurdish national rights. With the Kurds deprived the 
right of statehood, they found themselves apportioned as minorities in the above mentioned 
new state systems (McDowall, 2004, p.1).
Kurds of Iraq
The Kurds of Iraq were part of Mosul province during the Ottoman rule. The British 
conquered the province in 1918 and formally annexed it to Iraq in 1926. Generally speaking, 
the Kurdish people considered their inclusion into the new state as a betrayal by the great 
powers. Consequently, they resisted the annexation by means of struggle in a context of 
national liberation movement. Until the advent of the Baath Party to power in 1968, three 
main periods in the history of the Kurdish struggle in Iraq can be identified. The first period 
(1918–1946) was marked by a slow transition from uncoordinated tribal rebellion, lacking a 
defined political direction. The second period (1946–1961) was marked by the establishment 
in 1946 of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which henceforth provided the Kurds 
with a national organizational structure, an ideological direction, and a political center. The 
third period (1961–1968) witnessed the emergence of a relatively strong Kurdish national 
movement. At the same time, the politicization of Kurdish society mobilized the Kurds for 
an all-out armed struggle which started in 1961 and continued, though interruptedly, until 
1991 (Bengio, 2012, p.13).
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The fourth period (1968–1991) started with a rapprochement between the Iraqi regime and 
the Kurdish leadership resulted in signing the March 11 Manifesto in 1970 which on paper 
guaranteed autonomy to the Kurds in the Kurdish areas, with proportional representation 
in the central government and equitable distribution of oil revenues. It also recognized 
Kurdish language as the official language in the proposed autonomous region. However, it 
postponed outlining the boundaries of Kurdistan region until a census could be conducted 
later. However, any hope of implementing the manifesto soon evaporated, as shortly after 
the signing, the regime expelled thousands of Faili-Kurds from Iraq and launched a policy 
of Arabization – designed to change the ethnic identity of targeted areas and cities by 
expelling the Kurds and replacing them with Arab settlers (Kirmanj, 2013, pp. 150-152). 
Eventually, Baghdad unilaterally decreed an autonomy statute for Kurdistan, but excluded 
strategic places such as Kirkuk, Khanaqin, Akra, and Sinjar from the autonomous region. 
The government proposal was rejected by the Kurds. In March of 1974, the conflict resumed, 
and fighting lasted for a year. According to official state records, more than 60,000 Iraqis 
were killed during the war in Kurdistan from March 1974 to March 1975 alone, including 
16,000 Iraqi soldiers (Kirmanj, 2013, p. 151; Bengio, 2012, p. 135).
After the collapse of the Kurdish rebellion, the regime commenced a systematic program of 
Arabization, internal displacement and deportation of the Kurds. While the Iraqi regime was 
preoccupied in implementing a policy of Arabization, the Kurdish rebels who had escaped 
and fled abroad after the failed 1974–1975 rebellion reorganized themselves into different 
groups. In addition to KDP a new player emerged i.e. the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
(PUK), headed by Jalal Talabani.
The Arabization policy continued and it was basically part of the process of internal 
colonization. For example, while the oil from the Kurdish region was exported, the revenue 
was used for the development ofthe Arab parts of Iraq (Kirmanj, 2013, p. 154). The 
process of Arabization culminated in the infamous Anfal operations of 1988. According 
to Human Rights Watch (HRW), the Iraqi government massacred between 50,000 and 
100,000 noncombatant Kurdish civilians (the Kurdish figure is 182,000), including women 
and children. Also, another 1,500,000 Kurds were relocated during the Anfal operations 
(Human Rights Watch, 1995, pp. 5). Most of Iraqi Kurdistan’s villages were simply wiped 
out (Kirmanj, 2013, pp. 153-156; Bengio, 2012, p. 184).
These onslaughts of the Kurds were to become etched in the collective Kurdish memory, it 
added another layer in the Kurdish shared memory (Hiltermann, 2007, pp. 226-227). If it 
were not for the Kuwait War, the Iraqi government would certainly have taken even more 
drastic measures to attain its objective to obliterate the Kurds from Iraq. But the invasion 
of Kuwait and its ramifications, in particular the 1991 uprising changed the political scene 
in Iraq forever.As the demoralized Iraqi troops retreated from Kuwait, a soldier aimed 
his gun at one of Saddam’s wall posters in Basra. The incident sparked antigovernment 
demonstrations that led to a widespread uprising. Within days it spread throughout southern 
Iraq. On March 5, 1991, shortly after the outbreak of the Shiite uprising in the south, another 
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uprising took place in the Kurdistan. The victory celebrations lasted almost to the end of 
March 1991. By early April 1991, the defeated and demoralized Kurdsof nearly 2 million 
people began an unprecedented exodus (Kirmanj, 2013, p. 160; Bengio, 2012, p. 199). 
Kurdistan Regional Government
As mentioned above, in October 1991, the Iraqi regime and its security apparatus once more 
lost control of the Kurdish areas. Consequently it withdrew its administration and military 
forces. This made the Kurdistan Front, an alliance of diverse Kurdish political groups to 
fill the vacuum created by holding a general election. Only the two major parties, the KDP 
and PUK, managed to secure seats. Since the results were closethey decided to divide 
the 100 parliamentary seats equally, with the 5 remaining seats awarded to the Christian 
minority.The elections in Kurdistan region greatly alarmed not only the Iraqi regime, but 
also neighbouring countries that feared a spillover effect on their own Kurdish populations 
(Bengio, 2012, p. 202). In 1992 after much deliberation at the Kurdistan Parliament 
federation was chosen as a platform to solve the Kurdish question in Iraq. So alarming 
did this development appear that it prompted a tripartite Syrian-Turkish-Iranian meeting in 
November 1992, aimed at curbing Kurdish ambitions (Bengio, 2012, p. 219).
Sadly, the region that had benefited from self-rule since 1992 was torn apart by severe 
internal fighting in 1994 that threatened its autonomy. Fighting soon split the region into two 
spheres of influence, the KDP and the PUK spheres. Barzani, leader of the KDP, took the 
world by surprise when in late August 1996 he called on the Iraqi Army to help in his struggle 
against the PUK. The move was widely perceived as a betrayal, both by the Kurdish people 
and their US supporters (Bengio, 2012, p. 232). By the end of 1998, casualties resulting 
from internal fighting had reached 3,000. The entire situation had agalvanizing effect 
for the Kurdish region in that Kurdish society became divided politically, economically, 
geographically, and even intellectually into two blocs. Nevertheless, mediation by various 
external and internal representatives, popular pressure from within the Kurdish community, 
and the realization by both factions that neither could win the war militarily finally resulted 
in a cease-fire. This led to the signing of an agreement in 1998 through the goodwill and 
assistance of the US. The end of the civil war created an environment where the Kurds, 
though slowly, embarked on the process of nation and state building within the state of Iraq.
Nation and State Building
In the last fifteen years, since the internal war came to an end, Kurdish national projects 
had begun to show embryonic signs of maturity. By 2003, the KRG had developed all the 
trappings of a quasi-state, which had greatly boosted its position in the aftermath of the 
war (Natali, 2010, pp. 127-131).In fact, the framework of a Kurdish quasi- state has been 
in the making from the early 1990s. It included a constitution, a parliament, a cabinet, and 
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security and defense forcesall of which became state symbols and function independently 
of Baghdad (Bengio, 2012, p. 279). The defense forces locally called Peshmerga numbered 
127,000 (Chapman, 2009, p. 112). Although, the unification of the Peshmerga has been 
ongoing since 2006, they are still strongly affiliated to their respective political parties, 
KDP and PUK. The KRG has about 100,000 personnel in police force. In addition, both 
the KDP and PUK have their own intelligence agenciesthat have nothing to do with Iraqi 
intelligence agencies. Indeed since 1991 no single Iraqi army personnel have been stationed 
in KR. Other signs of nation and state building, separate of Iraq, can be seen from the 
adoption of the Kurdish national anthem, printing of stamps, building of monuments, 
memorial sculptures, and museums. Lately two international airports were built where 
foreigners could get their visas from Kurdish officers and not from Iraqi foreign ministry 
officials. The Kurdish language has also witnessed an unprecedented renaissance following 
the establishment of KRG. The younger generation has access to schools, colleges, and 
universities that teach in their Kurdish mother tongue. Currently, the Region has nine 
public universities, excluding the English Language University of Kurdistan. There are 
some ten private universities including the American University of Iraq in Suleimaniya. 
The emergence of a third party, the Gorran Movement, as opposition in parliament, had 
slowed down the headway of Islamists that begun in mid 1990s. Not surprisingly the KRG 
experiment in Iraq has energized the other Kurdish communities, especially in Turkey and 
Syria. Generally speaking, the Kurds in Iraq have been more successful than the central 
government with regard to building projects. This is primarily because the KR has been 
the most stable and war-free region in the country. Being the most organized militarily 
and the strongest economically, the Kurds have added their weight to the shaping of post-
Saddam Iraq, also (Bengio, 2012, pp. 297-298). There have not been any terrorist attacks in 
the KR in several years.The political changes that had taken place in Iraqi Kurdistan after 
1991 and the existence of the Kurdish quasi-state since 1992 coalesced to cause a sense 
of political and national cohesiveness among urban and literate Kurds in which a widely 
accepted identity as ‘Kurdistanis’ displacing the former self-designation of ‘Iraqi Kurds’ or 
‘Iraqis’ (Aziz, 2010, p. 5; Stansfield, 2006, pp. 264–265).
Despite these great achievements for a nation that rose from the ashes of genocide and 
chemical bombs the KRG and the Kurds still face enormous challenges. On the home 
front, it needs to articulate a clear-cut vision regarding the future of the Kurds in Iraq. The 
democratizing experience remains a fledgling enterprise; Freedom of expression is farfrom 
guaranteed. On the social level tribalism, nepotism, corruption, honour killings and sexism 
are rampant. More importantly, although the two rival parties of the KDP and PUK have 
taken steps to unify the administration and governmental institutions, deep down rivalry and 
competition are very much alive (Bengio, 2012, p. 307).The human rights situation in KR 
was volatile in 2011 as a result of the crackdown on the pro-democracy demonstrations in 
spring 2011. The Kurdistan Region does not have permanent representatives at the UN, nor 
does any state recognize its entity or its right to self-determination. Nevertheless, with the 
emergence of the Kurdish quasi-state in Iraq they are closer to achieving it than at any time 
in the past century. 
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Political System
The KR is officially a federation within Iraq. Its three main institutions are the Kurdistan 
Regional Government (KRG) and the Kurdistan Parliament (KP) established first in 1992, 
and the Kurdistan Region Presidency (KRP) established later in 2005. As proposed in Iraq’s 
federal constitution, Kurdistan’s institutions exercise legislative and executive authority in 
many areas, including the Regional budget, police and security forces, education and health 
policies, natural resource management and infrastructural development. Although the 
Iraqi constitution states that in “formulating foreign policy and diplomatic representation; 
negotiating, signing, and ratifying international treaties and agreements; formulating 
foreign sovereign economic and trade policy” the federal government shall be the exclusive 
authoritybut in reality the KRG practices most of these policies without consulting the 
federal government.
The KR is yet to have a permanent constitution. The proposed draft constitution was 
ratified by the KP in June 2009. It was supposed to have been put to vote in a referendum. 
However, the emergence of a strong opposition in the political arena after the 2009 elections 
became an obstacle for the two major parties to put the draft to a popular referendum. New 
elections wereheld recently on September 21, 2013. It is yet to be known whether the ruling 
coalitionwill consult with the opposition regarding contentious items and articles in the 
draft constitution, to reach national consensus.
In the absence of a constitution the KRG exercises executive power according to the KR’s 
laws, as enacted by the KP. The term of the current government which assumed office on 
April 5, 2012 expired in September 2013, was led by Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani, 
from KDP. Prior to him, Barham Salih, from PUK, headed the coalition government for two 
years. The cabinet is made up of members of the Kurdistani List coalition, which won the 
region’s parliamentary elections in July 2009. The 19 cabinet ministers are from the KDP, 
PUK, Kurdistan Islamic Movement, the Chaldean Assyrian Syriac Council, Turkmen, 
Communists and Socialists representatives. The President of the Kurdistan Region holds 
the highest executive authority and he is elected by secret ballot in a popular vote every 
four years and can stand for election for a second term. However, this rule was breached as 
Barzani’s term in office was extended for two more years in June 2013.
The current, 2009-2013 Parliament which has 111 seats consists of 59 members from KDP 
and PUK coalition, 25 from Gorran Movement, 13 from the Reform and Services List (an 
Islamist dominated block), 2 members from Islamic Movement List, 1 member from the 
Freedom and Social Justice List. The remaining, 11 seats arereserved for minority groups - 
5 seats for Turkmen, 5 seats for Christians and 1 seat for the Armenians.
Foreign Relations and Foreign Policy
The unfortunate Kurdish internal civil war from 1994 to 1998, willingly or unwillingly, 
pushed the regional and super powers to get involved in the Kurdish politics that resulted 
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in the internationalization of the Kurdish cause. The KDP and PUK, attempted to increase 
their respective spheres of influence through alliances with regional powers –the KDP with 
Turkey and Iraq, and the PUK with Iran. The regional powers tried to exploit the power 
struggle of local Kurdish groups, primarilyto keep the Kurds of Iraq and their own Kurds in 
check. US involvement was mostly to contain the local and regional powers.
The late 1990s witnessed intensive efforts by various regional and western governments 
to mediate between the KDP and PUK. It helped upgrade relations with outside powers as 
the mediators began to regard their Kurdish interlocutors as representatives of a Kurdish 
entity and not of an Iraqi state (Bengio, 2012, p. 246). Initially, French involvement in 
the mediation efforts somehow contributed towards internationalization of the Kurdish 
problem. Later, when the US got involved it further internationalized its cause. By 1996 
the US under the auspices of Foreign Minister, Madeleine Albright managed to broker 
a cease-fire which eventually led to an agreement between the KDP and PUK. In 1998, 
the State Department issued a statement which mentioned the Kurds’ aspiration “that Iraq 
be reformed on a federative basis” (Bengio 2012, p. 264). This was the first time that US 
officially recognized the right of the Kurdish nation in Iraq, though, in the framework of a 
united Iraq. In June 2000 the US Vice President, Al Gore, reaffirmed the US commitment 
to “the protection of the people of Iraqi Kurdistan”(Bengio, 2012, p. 265). The existence of 
a large Kurdish diaspora in Europe, numbering nearly one million, also served as a catalyst 
for internationalizing the Kurdish issue.
The event that boosted to KRG’s internationalization of Kurdish cause was the 2003 US-led 
Iraq War. It basically turned the Kurds from a local to a regional if not say an international 
player. In February 2003, the KDP and PUK declared their intention to join the US forces 
in the anticipated war against Iraq. At the same time in its drive to gain world support and 
Kurdish cooperation, the US chose the Halabja chemical bombing to justify the war.The 
position of the Kurds enhanced, primarily, due to Turkey’s decision not to allow the passage 
of Allied forces through its territory. Generally speaking, the Iraq war proved to be a golden 
opportunity for the Kurds to leave their mark on the domestic, regional, and international 
arena (Bengio, 2012, p. 268; Ozcan, 2011, p. 75). In recent years, the growing importance of 
the Kurdistan Region is to an extent the byproduct of two important factors. First, is the rise 
of sectarianism in the Middle East and second, the richness of the KR of natural resources 
(Bryza, 2012, p. 56).
Iraq
Before the establishment of the KRG, the Kurdish leadership and Iraqi authorities negotiated 
a settlement to the Kurdish question. The process continued until mid-1991 with discussions 
focusing on four key points: mutual trust, democratization, Kurdish national rights, and 
Iraq’s national unity. As in previous negotiations (from 1961 to 1984), the fate of Kirkuk 
and demarcation of the borders of the Kurdish autonomous region became the main points 
of contention (Kirmanj, 2013, p. 182). In May 1998, the Iraqi authorities revealed that the 
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central government was in regular contact with the Kurds and Baghdad would have reached 
an agreement with the Kurds, had the US not prevented the Kurds from doing so (Bengio, 
2012, p. 250). While on the tactical level both the Kurds and Baghdad sought to leave the 
line of communications open between them, strategically speaking the two parties remained 
far apart. Once more, negotiations failed. In addition to previous issues and obstacles, this 
time federation emerged as another issue. By early 2000s, the years of separation from 
Iraq had produced a generation of Kurds that had minimal contact with the Arab Iraqis. 
Moreover, the new generation of Kurds had been introduced to a school curriculum that 
emphasized the sense of belonging to Kurdistan rather than to Iraq (Kirmanj, 2013, p. 186).
After the collapse of Saddam’s regime, in 2003, and the emergence of the Arab-Shiites 
dominated government, initially, the Kurds and the Arab-Shiites enjoyed a close relationship 
for a few years. However, this good relationship did not last long. The first sign of disunity 
appeared when Ibrahim al-Ja‘fari, the prime minister of the transitional government, omitted 
the phrase “federal and democratic” from the oath of inauguration in May 2005. This move 
enraged Kurdish leaders and raised fear among ordinary Kurds because many Arab-Shiites 
seemed to be like the Arab-Sunnis before them, rejected the notion of federalism. Another 
disagreement developed over the use of the Iraqi flag when Barzani, the President of the 
KR, banned the display of the Iraqi flag in August 2006 claiming that “mass-killings were 
committed in its name. Therefore, it is impossible [for us] to hoist this flag in Kurdistan” 
(Agence France-Presse, 2010).
In addition, the KRG had yet to settle differences with the central government over 
some major issues, including: the division of power between the region and the federal 
government; the distribution of resources; the right to sign oil deals with companies; and, 
most importantly, the chronic problem of Kirkuk and the territorial delineation of the KR. 
The unyielding Kurdish stance with regard to the inclusion of the oil-rich district of Kirkuk 
in their region has been interpreted by Baghdad as a clear indication of their aspirations 
to achieve economic and, in the long run, political independence.Central to the conflict 
between the Kurds and Arab Iraqis is not only the issue of recognizing the Kurds as an 
ethnic/national group but the recognition of Kurdistan as a homeland regardless of whether 
it is inside or out-side of Iraq’s borders. Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution provides an 
opportunity for resolving the issue of demarcation of Kurdistan borders within Iraq based 
on referendum that was supposed to have been held by December 31, 2007, a date that had 
already passed. The disputed areas between the Kurds and Iraqis, contain about 14 percent 
of Iraq’s proven oil reserves, which are estimated at 143 billion barrels. Iraqis fear is that, 
with the wealth of disputed areas to provide a strong economic base, Kurdistan may declare 
independence.
Turkey
A couple of decades ago, no one would have ever imagined that today KG would be debating 
on Turkish foreign policy towards the KR (Charountaki, 2012, p. 185). The establishment 
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of the KRG’s relations with Turkey can be divided into four stages. The first stage came 
about as a result of Turkish support for the creation of no-fly-zone over Kurdistan region 
in May 1991 and the Turkish approval of the US’s plans to attack Iraq from Turkey’s 
Incirlik air base (Charountaki, 2012, p. 187). The aftermath of Saddam’s overthrow marked 
the second stage in Turkish’s relations with the KRG.Between the years 2003 to 2008, 
Turks feared further empowerment of the KRG in the event of incorporation of the oil-rich 
region of Kirkuk immediately after the fall of Saddam. Turkey exercised pressure to limit 
the federalism of the future Iraqi state and the degree of autonomy given to any Kurdish 
federalist region (Charountaki, 2012, p. 191; Rafaat, 2007, p. 81). During the second stage, 
the Turkish government boycotted the KRG, and worked exclusively with the Iraqi central 
government, depicting the Kurdish leaders as tribal chieftains. It was only in 2008 when 
the Turkish-KRG rapprochement started that the first direct high level meeting between 
the KRG and Turkey was held in Baghdad in May 2008. The meeting was followed by 
the Turkish Prime Minister making a historic visit to the Erbil meeting with the President 
Barzani in March 2011 (Charountaki, 2012, p.192).
Why has there been a shift in position, from denial to recognition and partnership? There 
are several factors behind the Turkish shift in position. First, Turkey realized that KRG not 
Baghdad was in control of the region. Second, oil contracts awarded by the KRG to major 
oil companies disregarding Baghdad ascended the status ofthe KRG and brought Ankara 
closer to Erbil. Third, the Turkish regional doctrinal policy approach based on a sectarian 
discourse vis-à-vis Iraqi Shiite dominated government aligned with Iran pushed Turkey 
closer to the KRG where the majority of population are Sunni Kurds. Fourth, Turkish fragile 
relation with its former ally Israel and its broken relation with Syria and Iran,has raised the 
Kurdish factor as a guarantor of the regional balance. Fifth, is the constitutional recognition 
of the KRG in 2005 (Charountaki, 2012, pp. 194-198; Ozcan, 2011, p. 72). Sixth, the 
independence of KRG from Iraq in developing its foreign policy and its implementation 
made KRG a direct partner for Turkey. Seventh, the Turkish soft approach to its own 
Kurdish should not be underestimated in its shift policy towards Kurds (Charountaki, 2012, 
p. 198; Bryaz, 2012, p. 57). Last but not least, Turkey’s energy thirst and the potential 
capabilities of the KR to meet Turkish demands for energy, and the KRG need for an outlet 
to export its natural resources contributed greatly in Turkish-KRG rapprochements. All 
these resulted in opening the Turkish Consulate in Erbil in 2010. By 2012 the overall trade 
volume between Turkey and Iraq was about $12 billion, while more than 70% was with the 
KRG (Charountaki, 2012, p. 194).
United States of America
In 1991 during the Kuwait war US President George Bush, called upon Iraqis to revolt, 
however, when the Kurds in the north and the Shiites in the south revolted, US failed to 
protect them from the regime. US became more involved in Kurdish affairs when it became 
the main mediator between the Kurdish warring factions, PUK and KDP, in 1990s. Until 
the invasion of Iraq, there was no overarching in US policy toward the Kurds. Rather, 
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the US interacted with Kurds precisely as they did with any other citizen of the various 
countrieswhere Kurds live (Ricciardone, 2000). Despite that, in time, the Kurds who were 
first viewed as a moral burden on the US became allies of sorts. This became evident when 
Turkey rejected to allow US forces to use Turkish territory to launch its campaign against 
Iraq in 2003 but the Kurds did. The role of KRG as an ally to US for the implementation 
of the US policy of regime change in Baghdad, as well as the KRG’s stability as a semi-
independent state, were major factors in the rising power of the KRG as an influential 
regional actor which left the US with no choice but to take the Kurds into consideration.
After the invasion of Iraq a major Kurdish priority was to secure and consolidate semi-
independent status of the KR. This seems to have challenged the US vision of ensuring 
a strong central government in Baghdad. This situation potentially put the two sides in 
contradictory positions (Rafaat, 2007, p. 79). According to Barzani, Paul Bremer, the 
American head of the Iraqi provisional authority, wanted to eliminate all references to the 
KRG from the interim constitution. Besides, the US initially avoided opening a consulate 
in KR (Rafaat, 2007, p.80; Gundi, 2013). Not long after the invasion of Iraq, US faced an 
insurgency from the Arab-Sunnis in Iraq, the growing strength of pro-Iranian Shiite parties 
and lack of regional and international support for its misguided adventure. All these and 
several other reasons, in particular US’s attempt to strengthen the anti-Iran camp,led to 
a rapprochement between the Kurds and US (Charountaki, 2012, p. 200; Rafaat, 2007, 
p. 81). The Americans conceded on a number of issues that had been rejected during the 
earlier phase. These included Talabani’s election as president (a reversal of US policy); 
federalism with a weaker central government; a clearer resolution for disputed area; and 
recognition of the Peshmerga as the guards of Kurdistan. Furthermore, US officials began 
visiting Kurdistan (Rafaat, 2007, p. 82). President of the KR, Barzani, visited Washington 
DC twice, in January 2010 and April 2012, where he met with President Obama and Vice 
President Biden. In July 2011 The US Consulate General was opened in Erbil. However 
in the absence of an official US policy towards Kurds, how long the “friendship and 
cooperation” will last is a question to which there is no definite answer. 
Economy
In 1991 as a result of the withdrawal of Iraq, some 300,000 civil servants lost their jobs and 
consequently their income. This state of affairs led to dire consequences that pushed the 
Kurdish economy to the “brink of the abyss” as unemployment reached 70-90% (Kirmanj, 
2013, p. 183). However, in 1996, the UN’s oil-for-food program relieved the economic and 
financial pressure on the Region. Nevertheless, it was only after the US invasion of Iraq 
where the real relief was felt when the KR started to get its portion, 17%, of the national 
Iraqi budget which amounted to approximately $12 billion was set aside for the KR in 2012. 
The region has proven reserves of around 45 billion barrels of crude oil, or about a third of 
Iraq’s total reserves, and one to three trillion cubic meters of gas (Decamme, 2013; Bryza, 
2012, p. 56). The relatively stable KR has attracted foreign companies and entrepreneurs 
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such as Exxon Mobil, Chevron and Total which have signed deals during the past years 
directly with the KRG bypassing Iraqi government. The Iraqi central government has 
retaliated by excluding Exxon Mobil and Chevron from its fourth round bidding in 2012 
of oil field tenders outside the KR. So far such threats have not prevented these major 
companies from entering directly into partnership with the KRG.
The Region is currently enjoying economic growth of 12%, faster than Iraq’s economy 
as a whole whichis expanding by 9%. Almost 800 foreign firms, the majority of them 
from Turkey, have so far entered the Kurdish market, apparently encouraged by the 2006 
investment law that exempts them from taxes on imports and profits for their first 10 years 
in the Region (Decamme, 2013). One negative aspect of the KRG’s investment law is that 
foreign firms are not obliged to hire local staff which basically means the foreign investment 
does not contribute to job creation in the Region. KRG’s investment in energy sector seems 
to be more productive compared to Iraq as the KR exports surplus power to Iraqi provinces. 
The natural population growth in Kurdistan Region is 3% and those between ages of 15-34 
constitute 34% of Kurdistan Region population (Ministry of Planning, 2012). Generally 
speaking, KR is more developed than the rest of Iraq in terms of education, economy and 
per capita income. According to Suleimaniya Statistic Directorate (2013) the poverty rate 
in KR is 5% while in the rest of Iraq it is 23%; the rate of unemployment in the KR is 6% 
while in Iraq it is 8%.
Despite these bright pictures, the Region still needs to increase investments that cancreate 
jobsin private sector and manufacturing industry. The general trend in the structure of 
public spending currently is in favor of operating expenses at the expense of investment 
expenditure. In 2012, the KRGas a public employerwas the largest employer providing 
more than 57% of full time work (Ministry of Planning, 2012, p. 52).
Administrative Set-up
The federal region of Kurdistan is divided into three provinces, the provinces of Dohuk, 
Erbil, and Suleimaniya. Each of these provinces is divided into districts with a total of 
26 districts. Each district is divided into sub-districts. Provinces have a capital city, while 
districts and sub-districts have district centers.
Kurdistan Region at Glance
Capital City: Erbil
Population: 5,351,276 (estimated)
Approximate size: 40,643 square kilometers, four times the area of Lebanon
Population growth rate: 2.55%
Life expectancy at birth: 58.2 years
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Ethnic groups: Kurds, Arabs, Assyrians, Turkmens, Armenians, due to the absence of a 
proper population census number and rate of ethnic groups is unknown.
Religion: Islam (majority of Kurdish, Turkmen, and Arabinhabitants of the region are 
Muslims), Christianity (is followed by Kaldo-Assyrians and Armenians) and Yazidis, 
Kakay and Shabak (small indigenous religious groups, Kurds by ethnicity)
Languages: Kurdish and Arabic are official languages
Literacy: 81.6%
GDP real growth rate: 12% (2012)
GDP Per Capita: $5,000 (2012) approximate
Budget: $12.0 billion (2012) approximate
Unemployment: 6%
Administrative divisions: 3 provinces
Establishment: 19 May 1992
National holiday: Kurdish National Day, 21 of March
Major Political Parties: Kurdistan Democratic Party, KDP [MasoudBarzani]; The Change 
Movement, Gorran [Nawshirwan Mustafa];Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, PUK [Jalal 
Talabani], Kurdistan Islamic Union, Yakgrtu [Muhammad Faraj]; Kurdistan Islamic Group, 
Komal [Ali Baper].
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